Understanding Pakistan: Why Pakistan’s Generals Live for Endless War

Pakistan’s generals thrive on chaos, using endless jihad to justify power while destroying their nation. Today we uncovers how fire, ruin, and perpetual conflict define Pakistan’s strategy, and why understanding this is key to India’s security and regional stability.

Understanding Pakistan: Why Pakistan’s Generals Live for Endless War
“In war, victory is not the end; it is the means.” – "The Quranic Concept of War" by Brigadier SK Malik. Malik explains that war’s purpose is to pave the way for establishing the divine order, not merely to gain territory. (p59)

There was once a drunk monkey that lived in a bamboo grove on the edge of a kingdom. This monkey would scream, throw stones, and steal fruits from passing villagers every day. It was small, weak, and often beaten back by villagers, yet it would return, screeching louder, and claim the grove as its own empire.

One day, a young warrior approached the old Zen master.

“Master, we have beaten the monkey many times, but it returns. It never accepts defeat. It disrupts our markets, attacks our children, and claims the grove as its kingdom. How do we defeat it forever?”

The master smiled.

“The monkey believes that as long as it screams, it wins. You believe that beating it back is victory. But so long as the monkey screams again, you have not won.”

The warrior asked, “Then what is victory, Master?”

The master walked silently to the grove. The monkey screamed, hurled fruit, and beat its chest. The master did not fight back. Instead, he cut down the entire grove.

With nowhere to hide, the monkey was caught, caged, and shown to the people.

The monkey, humiliated and stripped of its kingdom, finally fell silent.

The master turned to the warrior:

“Victory is not in silencing the monkey’s screams for a day. It is in destroying the illusion of its kingdom, breaking its spirit to scream, and showing all who watched that the monkey was never a king, but a beggar with stolen fruit.”

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Operation Sindoor - A Resounding Victory but....

Operation Sindoor (May 2025) was India’s limited military campaign launched in retaliation for a major terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir. It consisted of precision missile and drone strikes against Pakistan-based terrorist infrastructure, marking an unprecedented stand-off engagement between India and Pakistan that stopped short of a full-scale war.

India targeted nine terrorist-linked sites (including Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba facilities in Pakistan’s mainland) using long-range, stand-off weapons.

The operation’s initial objectives were to punish and degrade the terrorist networks responsible for cross-border attacks while avoiding strikes on Pakistan’s regular military or civilian targets. After the Pakistani military responded to attacks on terror centers, the mission included the backers of terrorists as well. After that no distinction was made between the two.

The operation was a resounding success. Let us list the top most achievements from the Indian standpoint. Here are the top five.

Total Air Dominance Achieved

  • India systematically degraded and destroyed Pakistan’s integrated air defense systems across PoJK and key Punjab sectors within 48 hours.
  • Established complete air dominance, enabling unchallenged ISR and strike operations.

Severe Attrition of Pakistan’s Air Force

  • Over two dozen PAF fighters (F-16s, JF-17s) destroyed or grounded due to runway craterings, targeted airbase strikes (Masroor, Sargodha, Minhas).
  • Air defense radars, key command facilities and fuel depots targeted, reducing PAF’s operational tempo.

Precision Strikes on Pakistan’s Strategic Assets

  • Successful hits on ISI operational hubs supporting infiltration and terror operations in PoJK.
  • Targeted destruction of terror launch pads across the LoC.

Demonstrated India’s Escalatory Dominance

  • Proved that India could calibrate force without crossing thresholds inviting immediate nuclear escalation.
  • Demonstrated rapid mobilization and strike capabilities with coordination between IAF, IA, and IN.

Tested Indigenous Systems Under Combat Conditions

  • Indigenous platforms (Tejas, Akash SAMs, Netra AEW&C) effectively integrated, proving their operational readiness.
  • Successful employment of stand-off precision-guided munitions and drones.

From a purely military standpoint, the battle successes were overwhelming, announcing Indian dominance.

Source: Achievements of Operation Sindoor / Defence Direct Education

You see, the impact of India's targeting of the Pakistani air bases was far more devastating than what came out in conventional media. We discussed that on YouTube.

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Please do subscribe to our YouTube channel as well for deep and incisive discussions. https://www.youtube.com/@drishtikonetv

So far, so good.

Actual Power Differential Despite Overwhelming Military and Financial Superiority

However, despite these gains, the limited scope of Operation Sindoor also underscored certain limitations.

By design, it avoided targeting Pakistan’s military or altering territory, thus stopping short of compelling any permanent change in Pakistan’s behavior.

Pakistan’s security establishment absorbed the strikes and retaliated within the limited conflict, launching its own operation (“Bunyan-un-Marsoos”) with drone and missile attacks on Indian military sites, which failed spectacularly.

While India’s strikes imposed short-term costs and asserted a “new normal” of response, they did not fundamentally dismantle Pakistan’s capacity or resolve to sponsor proxy warfare.

Indeed, Islamabad’s military doctrines and ideological posture, rooted in an enduring hostility toward India, remain intact and continue to fuel its confrontation with India.

The crisis, though managed, raised questions about long-term deterrence: can repeated limited operations truly dissuade Pakistan, or do they risk a cycle of escalation without altering Pakistan’s strategic calculus?

Where is the gap between India's overwhelming military superiority and even larger budget differential and the final narrative that the media and history records?

Let us understand it.

India's military budget differential versus Pakistan is almost 9 times.

Source: India’s Defense Budget Outgrows Pakistan’s/ Statista

How is it that despite having almost 9 times the military budget, India does not seem to punch as strongly during its confrontations against Pakistan?

When you look at the factors that dim the differential, then they would include:

Narrative Losses: The narrative machinery from Pakistan and the anti-India groups across the West, the Chinese-influenced world, and internally in India is substantial. It can reverse actual victories in narratives. Given that only a handful of Indian military officers would know the actual reality, the "narrative losses" play a significant role in resetting the war story even within the military circles.

Weapons for China: While the entire spectrum of weapons is created with both, China and Pakistan in mind, substantial investment may be going into arms specifically for China.

Indigenous Science: The success of Indian weapons hinges inherently on internal R&D and the "Make in India" factor. Purchasing weapons from outside could have been faster and cheaper, though extremely risky. So much of mili investment remains in R&D.

Actual differential vs Pakistan: Given all these factors, we aver that the real differential would be less than 50% of the almost 9 times of budget superiority that India enjoys.

We have tried to show where the differential gets eroded via a waterfall chart. The markers below are just for illustration and do not have a logical or mathematical basis.

Having said that, India-Pakistan wars suffer from two other main weaknesses:

  1. Pakistan's conceptualization of war and what constitutes a victory
  2. India's mission objectives for an operation not comprehensive enough to over-ride Pakistan's understanding of war results

The result is that most of the attacks by India are not a declaration of war, but the launching of operations. The result is that Pakistan’s military and by extension, the beholden Indian media and “intellectual“ circles parade the falsehood of Pakistan’s “victory“ even when they lose miserably.

Fundamentally, there is a difference between a War and an Operation.

Operation Vs War: A limited mission is inherently defeatist

In the Indian subcontinent’s strategic lexicon, there is a crucial difference between a limited military operation and a full-fledged war, especially between two nuclear-armed rivals like India and Pakistan.

A declared war typically involves general mobilization of forces, broad war aims (such as territorial conquest or complete military defeat of the opponent), and an official belligerent status under international law.

In contrast, an “operation” usually denotes a contained use of force for specific objectives – often punitive or retaliatory – without an open-ended intent to engage in total war.

Since the late 20th century (especially post-1971), India and Pakistan have avoided formal declarations of war even during serious hostilities, preferring to limit conflicts in scope and duration. This is partly due to the nuclear shadow: both states recognize that an uncontrolled war could escalate into a nuclear exchange, so they carefully calibrate their military actions.

For example, the 1999 Kargil conflict – though intense – was never officially declared a war by either side; India treated it as an “operation” (code-named Operation Vijay) to evict intruders from its territory, consciously confining the conflict to the Kargil sector and not crossing the Line of Control (LoC), to prevent escalation.

Similarly, recent Indian retaliatory strikes (2016, 2019, 2025) have been termed operations, underscoring limited aims and duration.

The semantics reflect strategic intent. Labeling a campaign an “operation” signals that the military action is bounded – a single episode or series of strikes – rather than open war. In the Indo-Pak context, this distinction is vital for crisis stability.

By keeping operations “short of war,” India seeks to punish Pakistan without crossing Pakistan’s perceived redlines for full-scale conflict or nuclear use. For instance, the Balakot airstrike of 2019 (Operation Bandar) was carefully calibrated to hit a terrorist camp outside Kashmir, in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

Yet, India emphasized that it was not an act of war against Pakistan – it was a counterterrorism operation limited in time and target.

This framing helped restrain the crisis, as Pakistan’s reprisal stayed limited to a tit-for-tat air skirmish, after which both sides de-escalated.

By contrast, a declared war would imply a state-to-state fight with far greater stakes and uncontrollable momentum. Declaring war activates different international expectations and may remove certain self-imposed constraints (for example, targeting enemy military assets broadly rather than a narrow set of targets).

In practical terms, India’s large-scale mobilization after the 2001 Parliament attack (Operation Parakram) showed the dilemma: a massive deployment signaled war preparedness, but ultimately India pulled back, wary of crossing into an actual war that could trigger nuclear retaliation. This experience drove India to develop limited military options short of war.

In the Indo-Pak milieu, an “operation” is a politically controlled, limited military endeavor – often one-off or short-term – aimed at specific goals, such as retaliation or coercive signaling. A “war,” on the other hand, entails general hostilities and broader objectives (e.g., forcing surrender or territorial change).

Keeping actions at the operational level allows India to manage escalation tightly. As Operation Sindoor illustrated, India struck Pakistan-based targets while insisting it had “no intent to attack the Pakistani military” or territory, thus framing the engagement as finite and defensive.

This distinction allowed both sides to step back after a few days, unlike in wars, which tend to expand until one side is defeated or major powers intervene.

Operation Sindoor’s Strategic Scope and the Long-Term Deterrence Question

Strategic Scope of Operation Sindoor: Operation Sindoor was unprecedented in scale among India’s retaliatory strikes to date, yet it remained strategically limited in objective. Its aim was not to occupy land or destroy Pakistan’s armed forces, but to “degrade a specific ecosystem of terrorist violence” on Pakistani soil.

Over ~4 days, India launched multiple waves of stand-off precision strikes using fighter jets (e.g. Rafales with SCALP missiles), ground-launched missiles, and armed drones. These targeted terrorist training camps, launchpads, and leadership hideouts across Pakistan-administered Kashmir and even deep in Punjab province.

India expanded its target set beyond previous operations, hitting not only forward launch camps but also the headquarters of Jaish-e-Mohammad in Bahawalpur and Lashkar-e-Taiba’s base in Muridke. By striking nine sites in one concerted campaign, India sought to impose tangible costs on the terror networks and their backers.

This represented a shift from prior symbolic strikes to a “cost-imposition” strategy aiming at real damage.

Crucially, Sindoor’s design included explicit limits: Indian pilots were ordered not to target Pakistani army units or shoot first at Pakistani jets, even at the expense of higher risk to Indian aircraft.

Source: Operation Sindoor and the Evolution of India’s Military Strategy Against Pakistan / War on the Rocks

This restraint was strategic – it signaled India’s focus on terrorists only, avoiding provocation that could widen the conflict.

Indeed, on the operation’s first day, India is rumored to have absorbed losses (Pakistani air defenses may have shot down one or more aircraft) because it chose not to pre-emptively suppress enemy air defenses or engage Pakistani fighters unless fired upon.

This self-imposed constraint, while costly tactically, kept the confrontation bounded and sent a clear message: India’s quarrel was with terrorism, not the Pakistani state. Such calibrated force indicates that Operation Sindoor’s scope was carefully managed – powerful enough to punish and deter, yet limited enough to avoid a general war.

Did Limited Objectives Undermine Long-Term Deterrence? This question strikes at the heart of India’s post-Sindoor strategic debate. On one hand, proponents argue that Sindoor strengthened deterrence by proving India’s willingness to retaliate forcefully and its ability to do so without triggering nuclear war By “calling Pakistan’s bluff” of nuclear blackmail and carving out space for conventional strikes below the nuclear threshold, India may have reset the deterrence balance – Islamabad can no longer assume that its nuclear arsenal will shield it from Indian conventional response to terrorism.

Source: Operation Sindoor establishes India’s New Response Doctrine towards Pakistan / BASIC

The operation’s success in hitting terror infrastructure and the relative international understanding it received (many global powers tacitly accepted India’s right to retaliate against terrorism) could discourage Pakistan from authorizing large-scale terror attacks in the near term. In that sense, limited objectives achieved a tactical deterrent effect: they punished the immediate provocation and signaled the cost of future misadventures.

On the other hand, critics caution that such one-off punitive operations have inherent limits in deterring a determined adversary over the long run. Pakistan’s response to Operation Sindoor itself is instructive.

Unlike after the 2016 Uri strikes or 2019 Balakot, when Pakistan could downplay or deny India’s actions, this time the damage was undeniable and public. Pakistan’s military felt compelled to retaliate militarily, launching its own drone and missile strikes on Indian targets and escalating the clash. The crisis only just stopped short of a wider war, thanks in part to diplomacy, where India accepted the white flag from Pakistan.

This sequence suggests a tit-for-tat escalation dynamic: each limited Indian strike raises the bar, prompting Pakistan to respond more forcefully (to avoid appearing weak or setting a precedent of impunity). Indeed, Sindoor led to “orders of magnitude more weapons and targets on both sides than previously” in such crises.

The risk is that iterative, limited operations could engender an action-reaction cycle that erodes stability. Over time, Pakistan might adjust its redlines, potentially meeting the next Indian operation with even bolder retaliation, inching the rivals closer to a broader conflict – and testing each other’s nuclear thresholds inadvertently.

Furthermore, long-term deterrence hinges on altering the adversary’s cost-benefit calculation in a durable way. Operation Sindoor, while painful for Pakistan in the moment, did not impose irreparable costs on Pakistan’s military or its proxy infrastructure. “As targeted groups adapt – dispersing assets, improving concealment – the demands on India’s intelligence and targeting will intensify.”

In other words, sustaining deterrence through limited strikes could become a game of diminishing returns, as militants find ways to harden or hide from Indian reprisals.

Walter Ladwig observes that the long-term viability of calibrated retaliation depends not just on political resolve but on whether India can continue to find meaningful targets and neutralize them faster than they regenerate. If future attacks occur despite Sindoor, it could indicate that the deterrent effect was temporary or insufficient, potentially emboldening the Pakistani side if they come to view India’s responses as ultimately tolerable or containable.

Operation Sindoor’s limited objectives provided a short-term deterrent burst and demonstrated a new level of Indian resolve. However, they arguably do not guarantee long-term deterrence, given Pakistan’s capacity to absorb punishment and persist in its strategy (as discussed below). The operation stopped short of any systemic change in Pakistan’s behavior – no militant group leadership was permanently eliminated, nor was Pakistan’s support apparatus dismantled.

True strategic deterrence would require either cumulative pain that eventually forces Pakistan to change course or a qualitatively different approach that addresses the root drivers of Pakistan’s aggressive policy.

Battling Quranic Concept of War and Pakistani Mindset

It is quite obvious and even overwhelmingly strong attacks and military victories are spun by Pakistani establishment as their "victories", despite every evidence to the contrary. From 1948 to 1965 to 1971 to Kargil to Operation Sindoor, the story has been consistent.

One needs to examine Pakistan’s ideological framework and strategic culture. That would help explain why limited military defeats or costs often fail to produce the “normal” deterrent effect on Pakistan.

There is a book that is highly significant in understanding the Pakistani military brain - the Quranic Concept of War.

Brigadier S.K. Malik's 1979 publication, endorsed by President Zia-ul-Haq, presents a profound exploration of war doctrines through the lens of Quranic principles.

Malik posits that for Muslims, warfare transcends mere physical or material conflict, embodying a spiritual imperative. This work significantly influenced Pakistan's military and ideological landscape, resonating with certain jihadist factions. By integrating religious and military paradigms, Malik's treatise offers a unique perspective on the intersection of faith and conflict, contributing to the evolution of Islamic military thought and its practical applications in modern warfare.

Battle of Uhud

Before we go further, let us dwell a bit on one battle that Mohammad fought - the Battle of Uhud. Malik’s interpretation of Uhud is central to the Pakistan Army’s jihad-centric strategic culture.

The Battle: The Battle of Uhud occurred in 625 CE between Muhammad’s forces from Medina and the Meccan Quraysh. Initially, the Muslims had the upper hand in the fight. However, a group of archers, driven by greed for war spoils, abandoned their strategic positions on the hillside despite clear instructions. This disobedience allowed the Meccan cavalry to launch a surprise attack from the rear, reversing the Muslims’ advantage. The battle ended with heavy Muslim casualties, including the death of 70 key companions, and Muhammad himself was injured, forcing the Muslims to retreat and regroup despite the setback.

Interpretation: Malik rejects the idea that “defeat” is determined by material losses or battlefield setbacks. He argues that true victory lies in maintaining faith, spirit, and commitment to jihad, regardless of physical casualties or territorial losses.

Using the Battle of Uhud as an example, he emphasizes that despite suffering heavy losses, the Muslims emerged victorious in the Quranic sense because their belief and resolve to continue fighting remained unshaken.

For Malik, victory means retaining spiritual strength and the will to persist in jihad, making the continuation of the struggle itself a triumph, even when outward circumstances suggest otherwise.

“The Battle of Uhud was a victory of faith, for it strengthened the believers’ resolve to continue jihad with greater vigor.”

Some key concepts of Pakistani Strategic Culture come from Malik's book.

Victory = Persistence, Not Battlefield Success: As long as the will to fight (jihad) remains, war is never truly lost. Even heavy material losses, like those suffered at Uhud, do not amount to defeat if the ideological commitment endures. Retaining faith and the spirit to continue the struggle is what defines victory, not temporary setbacks. It is the continued resolve, not material outcomes, that determines whether a battle or a war has truly been lost.

Total war is beyond kinetics: War is fought on spiritual, ideological, and psychological fronts. Loss of land, casualties, or tactical setbacks do not matter if the spirit of jihad remains alive. True defeat occurs only when the will to fight is broken, not when material losses are suffered on the battlefield.

Perpetual Conflict as Strategy: The Pakistan Army remains committed to perpetual hostility against India. Even after repeated military setbacks, it does not view itself as defeated. For Pakistan, survival and the ability to continue resistance are themselves considered victory. The focus is not on winning battles but on maintaining constant opposition, keeping the spirit of conflict alive at all costs.

Conventional asymmetry is Irrelevant: Battlefield inferiority or economic weakness is irrelevant if Pakistan can keep India unsettled using jihad and proxy warfare.

“Victory in war is the creation of a favourable psychological state to accept the will of Allah, not mere territorial conquest.”

Ideological Engine - The Quranic Concept

Malik's central argument is that for a Muslim state, war is not an aberration but an integral part of a continuous struggle. He posits that Jihad is the equivalent of "total strategy" or "policy-in-execution," a never-ending struggle waged on all fronts—political, economic, social, psychological, and spiritual—to achieve the state's ultimate mission.Military force is but one instrument within this totalizing concept of conflict.

This worldview primes the military for a permanent state of confrontation, where peace is merely a temporary truce and the struggle is eternal.  

The most striking and controversial aspect of Malik's thesis is his focus on terror as the central object of war. He argues that the Quranic strategy is to "prepare... to the utmost of your power... to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies".

For Malik, terror is not merely a byproduct of war or a means to an end; it is the "end in itself".

Victory is achieved not when the enemy's army is destroyed, but when his soul is paralyzed by fear and his faith is dislocated.

"Terror," he writes, "is the decision we wish to impose upon him".

This doctrine provides a powerful religious sanction for the use of terrorism and psychological warfare as primary instruments of state policy, aimed at shattering the enemy's will to resist.  

This ideological framework finds a deeper, more manipulative context in the analysis provided by Dr. K.V. Paliwal in Two Faces of Jihad.

Paliwal argues that Islamic doctrine, through the principle of abrogation where later, more aggressive Medinan verses supersede earlier, peaceful Meccan verses, has developed a strategic duality. This "two-faced" approach allows for the situational application of different personas: a peaceful, tolerant "Meccan" face when politically weak, and an aggressive, expansionist "Medinan" face when politically strong. 

This duality is masterfully employed in Pakistani statecraft. To the Western world, especially when seeking aid or diplomatic support, Pakistan presents a "Meccan" face: a partner in the "war on terror," a victim of extremism, a voice of moderation. Simultaneously, it wages a relentless "Medinan" proxy war against India, fueled by the very ideological fervor articulated by Malik. This explains Pakistan's remarkable diplomatic resilience in the face of overwhelming evidence of its support for terrorism. It is not merely a state engaging in a "double game"; it is an ideological actor adept at deploying contradictory narratives as a core element of its total strategy. India's own doctrine must therefore be sophisticated enough to counter both faces: a hard-power response to Pakistan's Medinan aggression and a relentless information and diplomatic campaign to unmask and neutralize its Meccan facade.

Fighting to the End

There is another book that is incredibly illuminating when it comes to understanding Pakistan's strategic culture and military mindset. Christine Fair's "Fighting to the End."

Some important takeaways from Christine are:

Pakistan’s Army Sees Itself as the Guardian of Islam and Pakistan’s Ideological Frontiers

  • The Pakistan Army does not see itself as just a national military but as the protector of Pakistan’s identity as an Islamic state.
  • This identity is defined in opposition to India and hinges on resisting India’s rise.

Strategic Culture Rooted in Perpetual Conflict with India

  • Pakistan’s Army is committed to an unending conflict with India, not necessarily to win but to prevent India’s regional dominance.
  • It measures success not by battlefield victories but by its ability to continue resisting India.

Preference for Risk and Conflict Over Stability

  • The Pakistan Army is willing to undertake high-risk actions, including support for non-state actors and nuclear brinkmanship, to keep the Kashmir issue alive and to resist India.
  • Stability is seen as detrimental because it could normalize relations with India, weakening the Army’s domestic role.

Inability to Accept Defeat

  • Pakistan does not accept losses in war as defeat if it can continue to resist, aligning with S.K. Malik’s jihad-centric doctrine.
  • Tactical and strategic failures (e.g., 1965, 1971, Kargil) do not alter its fundamental objective of resisting India.

Use of Asymmetric and Proxy Warfare

  • Since it cannot defeat India conventionally, Pakistan uses terrorist proxies, insurgencies, and covert operations as strategic tools to weaken India and tie down its resources.

Army’s Dominance in Pakistan’s Political and Security Policies

  • The Pakistan Army dominates foreign policy and internal politics to ensure the continuation of its India-centric policies.
  • Peace initiatives are often undermined by the Army to maintain its control and relevance.
Christine Fair’s book argues that Pakistan’s Army, driven by a deeply entrenched strategic culture, prefers perpetual conflict with India over peace, defining success as continuous resistance rather than victory, using asymmetric warfare while preventing any normalization that might threaten its domestic and ideological dominance.

Fair’s central thesis is that the Pakistan Army possesses a strategic culture that allows it to rationalize, reframe, or outright deny its military defeats. With the singular exception of the 1971 war, which was too catastrophic to spin, the army "does not see itself as ever having been defeated militarily" by India.Pakistani military histories and memoirs consistently focus on tactical victories or acts of battlefield bravery, while blaming political leadership or international betrayal for strategic failures like the Kargil withdrawal.

This selective memory sustains an institutional myth of martial superiority and divine favor, preventing the kind of introspection that would normally follow repeated military losses.  

This refusal to internalize defeat is buttressed by an ideological obsession that casts India as an existential, irreconcilable enemy. The Pakistan Army sees itself as the ultimate "guardian of Pakistan's ideology"—the Two-Nation Theory—which frames the conflict not as a political dispute but as a civilizational struggle between "Muslim Pakistan" and "Hindu India".Indian Hindus are routinely depicted in Pakistani military literature as cunning, cowardly, and inherently antagonistic to Islam.

This dehumanization of the adversary makes compromise impossible and perpetual conflict a sacred duty.  

Furthermore, Fair argues that the Pakistan Army has an unorthodox concept of victory where endurance itself is a triumph. Simply by continuing to resist India's conventional superiority and challenging its regional dominance, the army achieves an "honorable" outcome. It seeks "parity in defeat"; even if it loses a round, it must extract a price from India (like downing a jet post-Balakot) to claim it gave as good as it got and thereby restore its deterrence credibility.This mindset explains why, paradoxically, Pakistan’s revisionist demands on India often increase after a loss, as the army doubles down to justify its sacrifices.

Synthesis of Fair and Malik - Understanding Pakistani Mindset

Both Malik and Fair’s analyses align in explaining why Pakistan’s Army embraces tactical and strategic defeats while still maintaining a narrative of “victory through continued resistance.”

Malik’s writings provide the ideological foundation, framing war as a spiritual and psychological struggle where persistence itself becomes victory.

This underpins the Pakistan Army’s belief system, shaping its readiness for perpetual hostility against India regardless of material setbacks.

Fair operationally describes how this mindset shapes Pakistan’s military and strategic behavior, showing how the Army converts survival and continued resistance into a symbol of triumph, sustaining its posture of conflict while avoiding accountability for failures.

Fair’s institutional analysis shows how this ideology is operationalized into a strategic culture that refuses to acknowledge defeat, valorizes resistance for its own sake, and views conflict with India as an eternal, existential struggle.

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For Pakistan, remember - Fighting = Winning and Stability = Defeat.

Punitive strikes like Operation Sindoor, while inflicting material damage, are processed through this ideological-institutional filter.

For the Pakistani establishment, such strikes are not a signal to cease hostilities but are instead absorbed as the expected "cost of Jihad"—a test of faith and resolve that must be endured.

The damage is repaired, the "martyrs" are glorified, and the institutional narrative of righteous struggle is reinforced. This creates an immunity to deterrence by punishment. India’s doctrine cannot be based on the assumption that inflicting pain will lead to a rational recalculation of costs and benefits by Pakistan, because the adversary's calculus is not rooted in rational-material logic.

It is driven by ideology, identity, and an institutional need to perpetuate the conflict. This fundamental disconnect is why India must now consider a new doctrinal approach.

Distilling India's Operations and "Wars" against Pakistan

India’s engagements with Pakistan have ranged from total wars (1971) to constrained strikes (2016, 2019, 2025). A few key patterns emerge:

  • Thresholds and Escalation: Each successive action since 1999 has tested new limits. The 2016 surgical strikes stayed just across the LoC in disputed territory; Pakistan’s denial helped contain escalation. The 2019 Balakot strike jumped a major threshold (entering Pakistani heartland airspace), and Pakistan felt compelled to respond with an overt military action, though still limited. Operation Sindoor 2025 escalated further in intensity and breadth – with both sides conducting multi-day strikes. Notably, by 2025, India’s use of force was no longer a one-off raid but a mini-campaign, and Pakistan’s retaliation was correspondingly larger. This progression suggests that Pakistan calibrates its response to India’s action; as India’s strikes become bolder, Pakistan’s response grows, maintaining a rough deterrence equilibrium. So far, both have managed to stop short of general war, but the margin for error is shrinking.
  • Outcomes vs Strategic Effect: Tactically, India “won” each of these encounters (except one could argue the aerial duel in 2019 was a draw, with one plane lost on each side). Strategic outcomes have been mixed. The 1971 war achieved a permanent strategic result – Bangladesh’s independence – fundamentally altering the subcontinent’s geopolitics. Kargil, while a military victory for India, did not stop Pakistan from pursuing proxy war thereafter (the very next year saw a terror hijacking, and 2001 an attack on India’s Parliament). The surgical strikes of 2016 and Balakot 2019 had temporary deterrent effect but did not eliminate the terror threat – Pakistan-sponsored attacks continued (Pulwama happened despite Uri’s retaliation; the 2025 Pahalgam attack happened despite Balakot). Operation Sindoor, by significantly degrading terror sites, might buy a longer pause, but Pakistan’s apparatus remains intact to rebuild. None of the limited operations have induced a lasting change in Pakistan’s policy of backing militants. They succeed as punishment, but not yet as true compellence.
  • Role of International Community: In all cases, international intervention (diplomatic pressure) has been crucial at some stage – be it superpower pressure on Pakistan to back down in 1999, or U.S. facilitation of de-escalation in 2019 and 2025. Global actors have generally sympathized with India’s fight against terrorism, but their paramount interest is preventing an Indo-Pak war (especially nuclear war). Thus, while they tacitly allowed India some space for punitive action, they also quickly step in to defuse crises. This means India’s leverage to press its advantage is often time-bound by the diplomatic clock; a longer or more ambitious campaign might draw international censure once immediate goals (stopping terror flare-up) are achieved.
  • Pakistani Learning and Adaptation: Pakistan has shown a pattern of responding asymmetrically. After 1971’s outright defeat, it shifted to nuclear weapons (by the 1980s) to prevent another Bangladesh scenario. After conventional attempts like Kargil failed, it leaned even more on jihadi proxies under the nuclear umbrella. When India pioneered limited strikes (2016, 2019), Pakistan began denying or downplaying to manage pressure. By 2025, Pakistan will have developed its own repertoire of quick reaction, e.g., deploying armed drones and short-range missiles to retaliate in kind to Sindoor. It also refrained from nuclear posturing, perhaps learning that nuclear bluster in previous crises (such as 2002 or even 2019 to some extent) invited international scorn without tangible benefits. This suggests that Pakistan is adjusting to India’s limited-war strategy by developing proportionate responses that still deter India from going further, without provoking global ire through nuclear threats. The enduring question is: if both sides continue to adjust, does this stabilize deterrence at a higher level of violence, or do we edge closer to a breaking point?

This comparative analysis highlights that, while India has refined the art of limited military operations, Pakistan’s fundamental strategic approach has not undergone a significant change in response.

From Punishment to Coercion: The Case for a New Indian Doctrine

Operation Sindoor, for all its operational prowess, laid bare the strategic cul-de-sac of India’s current doctrine. A policy centered on reactive, punitive strikes has successfully demonstrated India's capability and resolve, but it has failed to achieve the most critical strategic objective: a lasting change in Pakistan's behavior. The cycle of terror, retaliation, temporary lull, and renewed terror continues, albeit at a higher threshold of violence. This necessitates a fundamental shift in Indian strategic thinking from punitive deterrence to strategic coercion.

The distinction is critical.

Punitive deterrence, as currently practiced, is a reactive posture. It aims to inflict costs after a provocation to deter a future attack. Its goal is to restore a fragile status quo and "teach a lesson," with the hope that the adversary will amend its ways. As decades of experience have shown, this hope is misplaced when dealing with an ideologically motivated revisionist state like Pakistan. 

Strategic coercion, in contrast, is a proactive posture. It does not merely seek to deter a future act but aims to compel a change in an adversary's current and ongoing policy—in this case, Pakistan’s state-sponsored use of terrorism. Its objective is not to restore the status quo but to actively and permanently alter it in India's favor. While a doctrine of punitive deterrence amounts to "mowing the grass," a doctrine of strategic coercion aims to poison the roots of the problem by targeting the institutional and structural enablers of Pakistan's proxy war.

Achieving such a permanent behavioral change is an ambitious and high-risk endeavor. It requires moving beyond targeting the symptoms (terrorist camps) to targeting the system that sustains them—the military-intelligence establishment of Pakistan. This could involve imposing cumulative, and potentially unbearable, costs on the Pakistan Army's assets, institutional pride, and internal stability until it concludes that the continuation of its proxy war is more dangerous to its own survival than abandoning it. A doctrine of strategic coercion would borrow from Cold War concepts of compellence: not just preventing an action, but forcing an adversary to undo or forsake a hostile course of action. For Pakistan, this would mean being pressured into verifiably dismantling terrorist groups like LeT and JeM, a step it has historically resisted with great success.

Recommendations for Achieving Strategic Victory

Finally, we come to a point where we need to look at the key objectives, instruments, and escalation strategies India should consider in future contingencies to move beyond tactical deterrence and toward a strategic victory – i.e., a lasting change in Pakistan’s behavior.

These recommendations are offered with the caveat that they must be calibrated to manage escalation carefully in a nuclear environment:

  • 1. Establish Clear Strategic Objectives: India should define what strategic victory means in concrete terms. For example: “No cross-border terror attacks originating from Pakistan” or “Pakistan dismantles specific terror organizations and curtails the ISI’s covert ops”. Having a measurable end-state focuses efforts. This might also include objectives like degrading Pakistan’s war-fighting ability in areas that fuel its adventurism (e.g., destruction of terror infrastructure and attrition of specific Pakistani military units that abet proxy war). By articulating these goals, India can align its military planning and diplomacy to serve a coherent endgame rather than just venting anger after each incident.
  • 2. Maintain and Upgrade Stand-Off Strike Capabilities: As shown by Sindoor, high-precision stand-off weapons (cruise missiles, drones, smart munitions) give India flexible options below the threshold of all-out war. India should continue investing in these capabilities – longer-range missiles, stealth drones, space-based surveillance – to be able to hit any target in Pakistan at will. A robust stand-off strike force enables rapid punitive action and the ability to escalate vertically (in intensity) without immediately resorting to a full invasion. The forces should be tri-service: Air Force for airstrikes, Army’s missile units, Navy’s land-attack options (like BrahMos from ships/submarines) to apply pressure from multiple fronts. By diversifying strike options, India can impose costs while complicating Pakistan’s defense.
  • 3. Integrate Limited War Options (E.g. Cold Start-like Operations): While stand-off strikes are invaluable, India might need the credibility of ground maneuvers for compellence. Thus, rejuvenating the concept of Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) – self-contained, swiftly deployable army formations – is recommended. These IBGs (as envisaged in Cold Start doctrine) would be capable of swift offensives into Pakistan at a shallow depth (perhaps 30-50 km) without a lengthy mobilization. Their purpose would not be annexation but to seize critical assets or territory that hurt Pakistan’s military psyche (for instance, capturing a Pakistani brigade headquarters or a key logistical node near the border) to use as leverage. Planning for such limited incursions (with rapid exit strategies) gives India an option between token strikes and all-out war. Importantly, these plans must be rehearsed in peacetime so that India can execute them quickly in a crisis window before international pressure forces a halt.
  • 4. Escalation Dominance and Signaling: India should develop an escalation ladder framework – mapping out steps of escalation (e.g., airstrikes -> larger wave -> limited ground incursion -> theater-wide conventional strikes) and ensure at each rung India holds a superior position. This requires both capability and signaling. Before or during a crisis, India’s leadership should communicate (through media statements or diplomatic channels) escalating warnings: e.g., “If terror attacks continue, we will expand targets to include XYZ”. Such signaling was partially done after Sindoor, with the PM declaring “terror and talks cannot go together” and that terrorists and their harboring government will be treated the same. Future communications could be even more explicit that India is prepared to widen the scope – hinting at strikes on Pakistan’s military infrastructure if provoked. The idea is to psychologically deter Pakistan’s decision-makers by convincing them India is ready to climb higher on the escalation ladder than they are.
  • 5. Leverage Diplomatic Isolation: India can work with global partners to keep Pakistan on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) radar (as it successfully did, with Pakistan grey-listed for inadequate action against terror financing). Diplomatically, India should preemptively brief key countries (U.S., Russia, EU, Gulf states) about Pakistan’s transgressions and India’s possible responses, building understanding, if not explicit, support. In crisis, India must use its diplomatic corps to counter Pakistan’s narrative and ensure the focus remains on Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism (thus legitimizing India’s action). The goal is twofold: deter external meddling that might restrain India too early, and maximize pressure on Pakistan from multiple angles. For instance, after an operation, India could push for UN statements condemning the terror attack (implicitly justifying India’s response) to further shame Pakistan. The recent trend of many nations backing India’s anti-terror stance can be solidified into a diplomatic front that makes Pakistan’s isolation palpable.
  • 6. Exploit Pakistan’s Internal Fault-Lines Covertly: As a pressure tactic short of overt war, India can consider more aggressive covert operations. This could involve supporting insurgent groups or dissidents in Pakistan’s restive regions (Baluch insurgents, Pashtun activists, etc.), cyber operations to disrupt Pakistani military command-and-control or reveal embarrassing information (e.g., exposing links between ISI and terrorists), and clandestine operations to target high-value terror operatives on Pakistani soil. Such activities, while risky, serve to stretch Pakistan’s security apparatus and make the cost of its own sub-conventional war far higher. If Pakistan’s Army finds itself firefighting on multiple fronts domestically, its appetite for external adventurism may diminish. It’s a strategy of reciprocity in kind: you support proxies against us, we can support proxies against you. This must be calibrated so as not to provoke uncontrolled chaos, but enough to give Pakistan’s generals a taste of their own medicine.
  • 7. Strengthen Defensive Posture (Missile Defense, Civil Defense): Preparing for worst-case escalation is essential to pursue a tougher doctrine credibly. India should accelerate the deployment of missile defense systems (e.g., the indigenous PAD/AAD interceptors and S-400 batteries) to protect major cities and military targets from Pakistani missiles. Civil defense preparedness (early warning, shelters, citizen drills) can mitigate the terror of potential Pakistani retaliation, conventional or otherwise. A leader confident in its damage limitation can make bolder decisions. By blunting Pakistan’s offensive options, India gains more room to maneuver. If Pakistan sees that its missile strikes or even tactical nukes would be less effective due to Indian defenses, the threat of escalation to nuclear war loses some potency, thereby enhancing India’s deterrence.
  • 8. Clear Red Lines and Conditionality: Finally, India should define and communicate clear red lines that, if crossed by Pakistan, will invite not just a limited strike but a strategic onslaught. For example, the involvement of Pakistan’s military in a major terror attack or the use of a tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) on the battlefield would trigger a massive Indian retaliation aimed at Pakistan’s military infrastructure and possibly leadership. These need to be credible – meaning India has prepared options to, say, take out a large chunk of Pakistan’s armored forces or naval assets in response. By articulating these extreme consequences for specific actions, India reinforces deterrence at the high end. On the flip side, India could also offer a diplomatic off-ramp: a signal that if Pakistan genuinely cracks down on terrorist groups and stops provocations, India is open to restoring dialogue and normalizing relations. Essentially, it presents Pakistan’s leadership with a choice – continued aggression leading to devastating counteractions or compliance leading to peace dividends. This dual messaging (threat of harsh punishment vs promise of peace) can be more effective than threats alone, as it gives Pakistan’s security elite a face-saving way out if they choose to de-escalate their posture.

Implementing these recommendations would mark a transformation in India’s strategy – from a traditionally defensive, reaction-oriented stance to a more proactive, coercive strategy. It aligns with the evolution already hinted by Operation Sindoor, where India moved from mere symbolic strikes to meaningful degradation of the adversary’s assets. However, such a doctrine requires strong political will, military readiness, and diplomatic finesse to manage the inherent risks. It also demands continual evaluation of Pakistan’s responses – the strategy must remain dynamic, adjusting if Pakistan signals willingness to back down or if, conversely, it escalates irresponsibly.

Operation Sindoor has been a watershed, showcasing both the potential and the limits of India’s current approach. It proved that India can retaliate forcefully yet control escalation – a significant step in the Indo-Pak equation. The challenge ahead is to build on this momentum and craft a strategy that does not just deter the next attack, but strives to break the cycle of violence perpetually. Achieving a “strategic victory” will likely require India to think beyond one-off operations and instead engage in sustained coercive diplomacy, economic pressure, and if necessary, repeated and intensifying military action that collectively persuade Pakistan’s leadership that the old games are no longer worth it. Only then can South Asia move towards a more stable peace, where deterrence is not just short-term and tactical, but enduring and transformative.

What lessons does the Quranic Concept of War teach Hindus under relentless Islamist attack?

Quranic conceptualization of war is not a Pakistani invention. It is followed by Iran and even internal Islamist groups within every country.

In the Indian context, this has an essential set of lessons for the Hindus.

Let us understand that.

Key premise of Quranic Concept of War (Malik):

  • War (jihad) is perpetual, ideological, and total.
  • Victory ≠ territorial gain but maintaining jihad’s spirit and inflicting constant insecurity on the enemy.
  • Using terror, psychological pressure, and continuous small-scale violence keeps the adversary unsettled, forcing ideological submission.

This is precisely how Islamist attacks in Kashmir, Bengal, UP, Kerala work: continuous, low-level violence, demographic expansion, and psychological intimidation to create an atmosphere of fear and insecurity while avoiding decisive confrontation. Escalate violence into a genocide when one is dominant.

So the question that Hindus have been asking on several fora is - How can the Hindus Survive?

How can Hindus Survive?

Recognize It Is a Perpetual War: Stop viewing attacks as isolated events. Recognize them as parts of a continuous ideological war aimed at establishing dominance. Each attack, regardless of its scale, fits into a broader strategy of persistent confrontation, wearing down the opponent’s resolve over time. This mindset allows the aggressor to frame ongoing violence as progress, turning every act into a step toward their larger ideological and strategic goals.

Build Physical Security: Establish community-level watch groups, legal defense networks, and rapid alert systems to strengthen collective security. Where legally permitted, organize self-defense and weapons training to prepare for potential threats effectively. Systematically document every incident, ensuring accurate records for local, national, and international advocacy. This documentation will help expose patterns of targeted violence and mobilize broader support, ensuring communities are not isolated when under attack. Building these protective networks empowers communities to respond swiftly and strategically to any threat they face.

Psychological Resilience: Do not internalize fear. Instead, honor and celebrate those who resist and survive, shifting the focus from perpetual mourning to courage and resilience. This mindset transforms communities from passive victims into active defenders, ensuring that the spirit of resistance remains alive even in the face of ongoing threats and challenges.

Legal and Institutional Pressure: File cases and pursue justice relentlessly to raise the cost for perpetrators and deter future attacks. Monitor police and administrative actions closely to ensure they remain neutral and accountable. Use tools like RTI, PILs, and other legal avenues to uncover and expose the support networks enabling violence. This systematic legal strategy not only holds individuals accountable but also dismantles the broader structures that sustain targeted aggression, turning the law into a powerful tool for community protection and justice.

... and Thrive

Demographic Consolidation: Invest in education, economic strength, and building strong community bonds. These foundations empower communities to effectively resist external threats. Actively work to reverse internal divisions based on caste, region, or language, and foster unity to present a cohesive front. A community that is educated, economically stable, and united can better protect its interests, ensuring resilience and strength against those who seek to divide or weaken it through targeted attacks or exploitation.

Narrative Warfare: Control the narrative with clarity and confidence. Systematically expose Islamist violence using verifiable data and personal stories, ensuring each incident is documented and shared widely. Create media content, videos, social media posts, and local WhatsApp group updates that reveal the truth on the ground, bypassing biased filters. Transition from a defensive posture to an assertive narrative that highlights facts while holding perpetrators and enablers accountable. This proactive approach educates the community, counters disinformation, and ensures that the reality of targeted violence is neither hidden nor dismissed, strengthening collective resolve and global awareness.

Strategic Political Engagement: Ensure communities vote in blocs to elect leaders who will actively protect their interests and security. Use this collective strength to push for laws that prevent illegal conversions, land jihad, and demographic encroachment. Voting strategically and in unity transforms communities from passive observers into active participants, shaping policies that safeguard their future, ensuring that leadership remains accountable and committed to addressing the specific challenges faced by the community with clarity and determination.

Economic Strength: Support Hindu businesses, boycott those funding Islamist networks of hate and extremism - for example, Halal-certified businesses. Build local economic ecosystems to reduce dependency.

Survival and "life as usual" are not possible over the next century for Hindus if they are not able to reverse the scourge of Islamism.

Reversing the Scourge of Islamism

Let's discuss different ways Hindus can use to fight the existential scourge of Islamism.

Breaking the spirit and infrastructure of jihad: Adopt a zero-tolerance policy toward Islamist violence using legal and administrative measures. Ensure every act of violence is pursued relentlessly in courts, making accountability unavoidable. Actively dismantle support systems such as illegal madrasas and hidden financial channels that fund or shelter radical networks. Strengthen intelligence efforts to identify these networks early and cut off their lifelines. Enforce strict, consistent policing in known hotspots to prevent attacks and discourage radical activities. By combining legal action, administrative focus, and firm policing, communities can protect themselves while ensuring that extremist violence is met with decisive, lawful consequences at every level.

Expose the Ideological Bankruptcy: Use Islamic texts to reveal how violence is justified by radicals, helping to separate moderate Muslims from extremist ideologies. Encourage open discussions that challenge Islamist supremacy in debates, media platforms, and intellectual circles, breaking the silence that allows radical narratives to grow unchallenged. By using their own texts and teachings to expose contradictions and incitements to violence, it becomes possible to weaken extremist claims while empowering moderate voices to reclaim space and challenge radical dominance confidently.

Reciprocal Psychological Warfare: Demonstrate that every attack will bring clear and visible consequences—legally, economically, and socially—for those responsible. It should be made known that violence will not go unanswered. At the same time, refuse to surrender to fear narratives that seek to weaken resolve. Instead, project confidence and resilience, showing that the community will stand firm, pursue justice, and protect itself, ensuring aggressors understand that each act of violence carries a significant cost.

Build Institutional Power: Courts, police, and media must not be captured by Islamist sympathizers. Create Hindu legal aid networks to defend victims and prosecute aggressors.

Strategic Patience: Islamists play the long game. Hindus must be prepared for a multi-decade resistance. Every community must have a 50-year vision.

Finally...

Islamism’s doctrine:

“Victory is continuing jihad and creating insecurity.”

To defeat it, Hindus must:

  1. Survive by creating secure, resilient, united communities.
  2. Thrive by building economic, intellectual, and narrative dominance.
  3. Reverse Islamism by breaking jihad’s spirit, dismantling its infrastructure, and exposing its ideology.
The ultimate victory is making jihad costly, futile, and unattractive while building a confident, secure Hindu society that cannot be demographically or psychologically outmaneuvered.

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